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Abstract 
  This paper studies the fact that 37 percent of the internal migrants in China do not sign a labor 
contract with their employers, as revealed in a nationwide survey. These contract-free jobs pay lower hourly 
wages, require longer weekly work hours, and provide less insurance or on-the-job training than regular jobs 
with contracts. We find that the co-villager networks play an important role in a migrant’s decision on whether 
to accept such insecure and irregular jobs. By employing a comprehensive nationwide survey in 2011 in the 
spatial autoregressive logit model, we show that the common behavior of not signing contracts in the co-
villager network increases the probability that a migrant accepts a contract-free job. We provide three 
possible explanations on how networks influence migrants’ contract decisions: job referral mechanism, limited 
information on contract benefits, and the "mini labor union" formed among co-villagers, which substitutes for 
a formal contract. In the sub-sample analysis, we also find that the effects are larger for migrants whose jobs 
were introduced by their co-villagers, male migrants, migrants with rural Hukou, short-term migrants, and less 
educated migrants. The heterogeneous effects for migrants of different employer types, industries, and home 
provinces provide policy implications. 
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1 Introduction
Why would people accept a job without the protection of a labor contract? This is a decision
made by around 37 percent of internal migrants in China based on a nationwide survey in 2011.1
Generally speaking, an “irregular” job without a contract is not attractive due to lower wages,
longer work hours, less insurance, and so forth. According to our data, these “irregular” jobs pay
at least 20 percent less hourly wages than the “regular” jobs that offer contracts, whereas they
demand almost 10 percent longer weekly work hours than “regular” jobs at the mean. Among the
migrants with “regular” jobs, 35 percent have work-related insurance and 48 percent receive on-
the-job training, while the figures are 4 percent and 18 percent for migrants with “irregular” jobs
(see Table 1B). There are around 271 million internal migrants in China in 2011, which accounts
for one-third of total urban population.2 Therefore, the welfare and return of migrant workers are
important for China to move from an economic pattern heavily dependent on exports to one in
which the demand of the country’s own internal market plays a larger role in economic growth
(Becker and Elfstrom, 2010).
In addition to the average low education level of internal migrants, which leads to less competi-
tive human capital and prevents them from obtaining better “regular” jobs, another important factor
that affects their acceptance of "irregular" jobs is the co-villager network.3 This paper shows that
if most co-villagers (from the same home province residing in the same host city), who form the
social network of an individual migrant, work for jobs without labor contracts, it is more likely that
the individual migrant will also accept a job without a contract. Previous literature has documented
the role that social networks play in migrants’ work decisions, welfare participation, and migrating
destinations (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Montgomery, 1991; Carrington, Detragiache,
and Vishwanath , 1996). Studies on “Guanxi” (Chinese expression of social networks) in China
have also received much attention (Zhang and Li, 2003; Lovett, Simmons and Kali, 1999). Chen,
Jin and Yue (2010) find that one’s migration decision is influenced by her co-villagers because
co-villagers help each other in moving cost and job search at the destination.
From the perspective of migrant employees, the job referral mechanism, limited information
on contract benefits, and the "mini labor union" formed among co-villagers are the main reasons
we emphasize why internal migrants’ decisions of accepting “irregular” jobs are affected by their
co-villager networks.
First of all, many migrants find their jobs through friends or relatives in their co-villager net-
works. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) build an explicit network model on the transmission
of job opening information, which leads to positive correlation between the employment status
of agents who are directly or indirectly connected in the network of relatives, friends or acquain-
tances. Therefore, a contagion effect or network externality of employment status is observed.
1Although the Contract Law enacted on January 1, 2008 in China requires employers to provide written labor
contracts for any position they offer, the law is not strictly implemented, especially during the global financial crisis
right after the law was first launched. Becker and Elfstrom (2010) cited from the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions
that only 32.8 percent of migrant workers had signed contracts by September 2008. They point out that the law
specified the contract coverage but did not effectively monitor the process of signing these contracts. In practice, costs
of employers certainly rise if they obey the requests on wage and hour provisions as well as injury and social insurance.
To avoid it, employers prefer to hire people who do not require contracts.
2Source: “Report on China’s Migrant Population Development 2012” edited by the National Population and Family
Planning Commission of China.
3In our sample, 69 percent of the migrants have an education level of middle school or below (see Table 1A).
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Ioannides and Loury (2004) conduct a comprehensive review on the effects of networks on job
search.4 Recently, Cingano and Rosolia (2012) show that the increase in the employment rate of
the network of former fellow workers reduces unemployment duration of individuals. However,
the above research does not specify the co-villager network in China. In our data, more than 42.2
percent jobs of migrants are obtained through co-villager networks, while the corresponding figure
in the literature is around 50%, summarized by Patacchini and Zenou (2012). They also show
that members of a particular ethnic group concentrate in specific jobs and when new employment
opportunities become available at their workplace, they pass this information along to contacts of
the same race and ethnic background.
In spite of the easier job-searching process, the quality of jobs introduced by contacts is not
necessarily high. Elliott (2001) finds that the use of informal contacts results in significantly lower
wages for less-educated workers. Battisti, Peri and Romiti (2016) also find that immigrants initially
located in places with larger co-ethnic networks are more likely to be employed at first, but earn
lower wages in the long run. Loury (2006) claims that jobs obtained through contacts are better
than those found through formal methods only when the contact is a prior-generation relative.
For our analysis, if most co-villagers of an internal migrant work in enterprises that do not offer
contracts, it is more likely that this migrant will be introduced to similar “irregular” jobs. On the
contrary, if she searches for jobs independently, the probability of entering an enterprise offering
"regular" jobs with a contract could be higher.
Secondly, migrants living and socializing in a large network acquire most information and
knowledge from their co-villagers with similar background. As a result of information block-
ing, they do not fully or clearly understand the benefits (such as insurance and training) and legal
protection bundling in a labor contract. Hence they imitate the behavior of their co-villagers.
Co-villagers’ higher propensity of accepting contract-free jobs increases the propensity for this
migrant to accept the same type of jobs. In Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000)’s work on
the usage of welfare programs, they conclude that social networks affect an individual’s behavior
and preference through two important channels: information and norms. With a randomized ex-
periment, Duflo and Saez (2003) analyze the positive effects of information and social interactions
on employees’ decisions to enroll in a retirement plan.
Lastly, collective bargaining from co-villager networks could substitute for labor contracts with
respect to employment protection. To understand this channel, we first ask “if a person could
choose between jobs with and without contracts, what can she benefit from the latter?” The answer
is flexibility. Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) find that after restrictions on the more
flexible fixed-term or temporary contracts were removed in the Spanish labor market, permanent
workers were replaced by temporary workers.5 Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) point out that
temporary contracts in Europe are an important component of labor market flexibility, especially
in countries characterized by high levels of employment protection. Measuring job flexibility by
4For example, there is a positive correlation between getting assistance from a fraternity or sorority contacts and
obtaining prestigious high-paying jobs (Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2002). Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) find that a
network, defined by residing in the same block, increases the probability of working together by over 33 percent.
Other literature on this issue includes Hellerstein, McInerney, and Neumark (2008), Falcón (2007), Munshi (2003),
Frijters, Shields and Price (2005), Battu, Seaman and Zenou (2011), to name a few.
5In fact, fixed-term or temporary contracts are both considered as "regular" jobs with contracts in our sample.
Nevertheless, the contract-free "irregular" jobs in our case are even more flexible but offer less protection for the
employees.
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the years a migrant has worked for her current employer, we find in our sample that the average
flexibility for jobs with and without contracts are 3.35 and 3.03 years, which implies that the latter
is more flexible than the former. In other words, migrant workers prefer to access flexibility at
the cost of lower wage and less employment security. This is particularly true for short-term job
seekers, such as those who still have to do farm work at certain seasons of the year or many women
who return home occasionally to take care of their children or old parents. Note that most internal
migrants in China are from the rural area with rural Hukou (85 percent in our sample, see Table
1A).6
On the other hand, collective bargaining makes it possible for a migrant not to worry much
about job security if she works with many co-villagers in the same workplace. In fact, a large
proportion of employees could threaten the employer with a strike or to quit all together, which
may prevent the institution from functioning. In this sense, the co-villager network can be regarded
as a “mini labor union” which raises the bargaining power of the migrants. The insecurity of a
contract-free job is thus reduced and the willingness of accepting it increases.
Besides the above 3 channels, from the perspective of the labor demand side, employers might
also make use of the co-villager network to strategically recruit migrant workers. Hensvik and
Nordstrom Skans (2016) verify that firms use referrals of productive employees in order to at-
tract workers with better qualities. In our case, employers may utilize co-village networks of the
provinces from which more migrants have accepted contract-free jobs to recruit workers who are
willing to accept the same type of irregular jobs. This possibility is also in line with the job-
searching channel from the labor supply side.
This paper applies a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model to examine how migrant workers’
acceptance of contract-free jobs is affected by their co-villager networks. The SAR model, also
known as the Cliff and Ord (1973) model, has been widely used in the empirical analysis of social
networks.7 Lin (2010) applies the SAR model to identify the peer effects in students’ academic
achievements. Baltagi and Yen (2014) allow spatial correlation among neighboring hospitals and
estimate the effects of externalities generated by competition and knowledge spillovers on hospital
treatment rates. In our case, the dependent variable of the SAR model is a binary variable indicating
whether a migrant accepts a job without a contract.
We employ the Dynamic Monitoring Survey of Internal Migrants in 2011 from the National
Population and Family Planning Commission of China. This is a nationwide survey with 128,000
individual migrants residing in 326 host cities in all 31 provinces of China, which has detailed
demographic and work information of each migrant. In particular, we know whether the migrant
has a contract as well as her home province and host city. In the benchmark SAR linear proba-
bility and logit regressions, we find that the probability of a migrant’s acceptance of a job without
a contract increases with the co-villager migrants’ acceptance of contract-free jobs. The effects
become larger for migrants whose jobs were introduced by their co-villagers, for male migrants,
migrants with rural Hukou, short-term migrants, and less educated migrants. We also find that the
network effects are only significant for some industries (manufacturing, construction, and lodging
and catering) and some employer types (e.g. private and self-employed business). Policy impli-
cation drawn from these facts is that more attention is needed for the implementation of the labor
6Hukou is a social identity status in China, categorized into two types: rural or urban.
7LeSage and Pace (2009) have a detailed introduction of the SAR model. Its applications are widespread from
studying spatial interactions at the macro level (countries, cities, etc.) to investigating social interactions at the micro
level (households, individuals, etc.).
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contract law in these areas. The network effects also vary across home provinces. In the provinces
of large network effects and a relatively high percentage of contract-free jobs (such as Chongqing,
Sichuan, Gansu, and Heilongjiang), there is dynamic concentration of job-contract types among
migrants from the same home province. If migrants from certain home provinces always find
“bad” low-paid jobs that do not offer contracts, their consumption in the host city as well as the
remittance they send back to their home province will be lower than migrants from other home
provinces, which will lead to income inequality across regions over time.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses a nationwide data set to study the interplay of
co-villager networks and the decisions of accepting a contract-free irregular job offer for internal
migrants in China. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the SAR
linear probability model and the SAR logit model. Section 3 describes data sources and reports
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and analyzes the network effects in
different subsamples. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
In the introduction, we emphasized three channels from the labor supply side that explain why
migrant workers are more likely to accept irregular jobs without contracts if more people in their
co-villager networks accept such jobs: the job search process, information blocking on contract
benefit, and collective bargaining of the mini labor union formed by co-villager networks at work.
To test the hypothesis that when the probability of co-villager migrants’ acceptance of jobs without
contracts increases, the probability increases for the targeting migrant to accept a job without a
contract, we assign an outcome dummy of job types equal to 1 if an individual has a contract-free
job, and 0 otherwise in the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model.8
The spatial weight matrix is specified based on the co-villager network, which is defined as
people flowing out of the same home province and residing in the same host city. Only people
within the network will make an impact on each other, as they are more likely to share information
and provide job protection for each other. It is assumed that each migrant is equally affected by
all others in the co-villager network. Hence, in the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, we as-
sume that each migrants in the same co-villager network has an identical influential weight which
is the inverse of the number of co-villagers in the network. For example, if there are 40 mi-
grants from Zhejiang province working in Shanghai, then for each migrant, her Zhejiang-Shanghai
network consists of 39 people and each person is assigned a weight of 1/39 so as to satisfy the
row-normalized condition of the spatial weight matrix. As a result, the spatial lagged dependent
variable is the weighted average of the contracting decision of these 39 migrants in the network
with the same weight of 1/39. Other migrants in the sample that do not belong to the Zhejiang-
Shanghai network are assigned zero weights. Using this spatial weight matrix, we estimate a spatial
autoregressive (SAR) linear probability model as well as a SAR logit model.
We caution that people from the same home province in the same host city in our survey data
do not necessarily know each other.9 Nevertheless, since the data is collected in a random way,
8We do not consider the migrant workers who are unemployed, because there are only 1.4 percent migrants who
report unemployed in our sample. Moreover, most migrants in our sample are from the rural area as mentioned. If
they do not have a job in the host city, they will return home to do farm work.
9There are other applications of the spatial methodology in the literature, where people in the same group do not
5
the co-villager network defined in the data is representative of the true network of the population,
which means the size of the networks in the sample is also proportional to the size of the true co-
villager networks. In other words, we assume that if there are more people from Sichuan province
working in Beijing in the true population, for example, we would see more Sichuan people in Bei-
jing in our data. Further, we also assume that if there are more people in the defined network, there
will be more interconnection occurring among them in the network. We are aware that the second
assumption is a little strong as people from different regions may have different co-villager cul-
ture and there may not be sufficient job-related interconnection among people in some co-villager
networks. As a result, we run subsample regressions for people whose jobs are introduced by co-
villagers. In this subsample, these people are indeed using their true co-villager interconnection to
find jobs.
2.1 The SAR Linear Probability Model
We start with a standard SAR linear probability model, which is given by
Ns
Contractis = l Â wis, js ·Contract js +Xisb + eis , is = 1,2, ...,Ns;s = 1,2, ...,n0. (1)
js=1
The index is represents migrant i in network s that consists of Ns migrants. There are a total number
of n migrants that can be divided into n0 networks. Contractis is a binary variable of migrant i’s
choice in accepting an irregular job without a contract (Contractis = 1) versus a regular job offering
a contract (Contractis = 0). The predicted value can be interpreted as the probability that a migrant
accepts a contract-free job. The spatial lagged dependent variable ÂNsjs=1 wis, js ·Contract js is a
weighted average of the decisions whether or not to accept a contract-free job of all other migrants
in the same network s as migrant i. As a typical element of an n⇥n predetermined spatial weight
matrix W , wis, jr relates to migrant i in network s and migrant j in network r, respectively. We
assign a positive weight to wis, jr if migrants i and j are in the same network; otherwise, zero.
More specifically, we define w 1is, js = N 1 if i = j and w  is, jr = 0 if s = r. In addition, the diagonals
elements of the spatial weight matrix are set equal to zero, that is, wis,is = 0. W is therefore a block-
diagonal matrix and the sum of each row is normalized to 1: Ân0r=1 Â
Nr Ns
j =r= =1 wis, jr Â js=1 wis, js 1
for is = 1,2, ...,Ns;s = 1,2, ...,n0. The coefficient l captures the network effects on the probability
of accepting a contract-free job.
Xis is a 1⇥k vector of exogenous characteristics of migrant i, including the log value of hourly
wage, gender, (rural or urban) Hukou status, marital status, age, years the migrant has stayed in the
residential city as well as the fixed effects of the current residential city, home province, education,
industry, occupation, type of employer, and the product of home province and education. eis is
an independent error with mean 0 and variance s2e,i. b is a k⇥ 1 vector of coefficients of these
exogenous regressors. We regard the fixed effects of the employer types as the controls from the
demand side of the migrant labor market.
necessarily know each other. For instance, Lin, Wu and Lee (2006) use occupation and township as a way to identify
connectivity between individuals in a study of national identity formation in Taiwan using spatial regressions. In this
paper, people may not know each other but they belong to the same occupational group or township group.
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Since each migrant belongs to only one home province, there is no overlap in the co-villager
network and the subscript s that indicates co-villager network can be suppressed for notation sim-
plification. Thus, Equation (1) can be simplified to
n
Contracti = l Â wi j ·Contract j +Xib + ei, i = 1,2, ...,n. (2)
j=1
An endogeneity issue arises as the decisions of taking contract-free irregular jobs of individuals
in the network are also influenced by the decision of the objective individual in a symmetric way.
In other words, Ânj=1 wi j ·Contract j is correlated with the error term ei. To achieve consistent
estimates, we follow a generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) approach suggested
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998).10 The estimation procedure involves two steps.
• Step 1: We estimate Equation (2) by the two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure using the
instrument set Z = (X ,WX), where X = (X
0
1,X
0 0
2, ...,Xn)
0 is an n⇥ k matrix of all exogenous
regressors, to obtain the residuals êi. Define Ŵ = diag(ê21, ê22, ..., ê2n) and L is a Cholesky
array that satisfies LŴL0 = I.
• Step 2: We premultiply regression (2) by L and estimate the transformed regression by
2SLS using (L0) 1Z as the instruments. The variance-covariance matrix is estimated by
the heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance procedure suggested by White (1980),
which is given by [R0Z(Z0ŴZ) 1Z0R] 1, where R = (W ·Contract,X) and Contract is the
n⇥1 vector of Contracti.
2.2 The SAR Logit Model
Since the predicted probabilities in the SAR linear probability model do not always fall between
0 and 1, we consider an SAR logit model which could better accommodate the binary nature of
the dependent variable and always provide meaningful probability predictions. However, the non-
linear transformation of a logit model adds complexity in the estimation procedure as the typical
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) often involves n integrals in the likelihood function which
can be burdensome when the sample size is large. Several approaches have been proposed to pro-
duce consistent estimates for the SAR model with a limited dependent variable. McMillen (1992)
suggests an expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate the coefficients of the spatial
probit model. Pinkse and Slade (1998) provide conditions of employing the generalized methods
of moments (GMM) estimation to the spatial probit model. LeSage (2000) proposes Bayesian sim-
ulation approaches for SAR models.11 Yet the computation intensities of these estimators depend
highly on the sample size n, since they require the inversion of an n⇥n matrix. In fact, our data set
includes 28,614 individuals (after data cleaning), which makes it difficult to apply the estimation
approaches mentioned above.
We estimate the SAR logit model using a linearized version of the generalized method of
moments (LGMM) suggested by Klier and McMillen (2008), which is particularly designed for
10See Lee (2003) and Kelejian, Prucha and Yuzefovich (2004) for instrumental variable estimation with different
sets of instruments.
11See LeSage and Pace (2009) and Smirnov (2010) for detailed reviews of the estimation methods for the spatial
discrete choice models.
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large samples. The estimation is reduced into two steps - standard logit followed by 2SLS. We
adopt their LGMM approach and consider the following SAR logit model
n
Contracti
⇤ = l Â wi j ·Contract⇤j +Xib +ui, i = 1,2, ...,n, (3)
j=1
Contracti = 1(Contracti
⇤ > 0),
where Contracti
⇤ is a latent continuous variable measuring the propensity of migrant i accepting a
contract-free irregular job versus a regular job offering contracts. Migrant i0s propensity depends
upon the spatially weighted average of propensities of other migrants in her network, which is
expressed as Ânj=1 wi j ·Contract⇤j , where wi j is the (i, j)th element of the spatial weight matrix W ,
defined in the same way as in the last section. In fact, Contracti
⇤ is unobservable. Instead, we
can only observe a binary variable Contracti which takes the value of 1 when migrant i accepts
an irregular job without contract, and 0 otherwise. 1(·) is an indicator function that takes the
value of 1 if Contracti
⇤ > 0, and 0 otherwise. When the coefficient of the network effect l > 0, it
implies that higher propensities of accepting jobs without contracts of migrants in the co-villager
network increase the propensity of accepting a contract-free irregular job of migrant i. ui follows an
independently distributed logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance s2u . Consider the matrix
form of Equation (3)
Contract⇤ = lWContract⇤+Xb +u, (4)
Contract = 1(Contract⇤ > 0),
where Contract⇤ and u are the n⇥1 vectors of Contracti⇤ and ui, respectively. X is an n⇥k matrix
of k exogenous regressors. The reduced form can be written as
Contract⇤ 1= (I  lW )  Xb +(I  lW ) 1u. (5)
The variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form error term (I   lW ) 1u is proportional to
S = [(I   lW )0 1(I   lW )]  , which implies heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation when spatial
dependence exists, i.e. l = 0. Denote the ith diagonal element of S as s2i , we define Xi⇤
X= is andi
X⇤⇤ I  lW  1= ( ) X⇤, where X⇤ is an n⇥ k matrix of Xi⇤.
6
2.3 The Linearized GMM Estimation
As in Pinkse and Slade (1998), the generalized logit residual can be represented by ei =Contracti
P , where P exp(X
⇤⇤
 
i i = i
b ) . Define the gradient terms as G ∂Pi = (Gb ,i,Gl ,i), where Gb ,i = i =1+exp(Xi⇤⇤b ) ∂b⇤⇤bPi(1 P ∂i)Xi⇤⇤ and G
P
l ,i = i =∂l Pi(1 P
X  i)[Hib   is2 Lii]. Hi is the ith row of matrix H = (Ii
 
lW ) 1WX⇤⇤, Lii is the ith diagonal element of L 1= 2S [W
0 (I  lW )+(I  lW )0W ]S. When
l = 0, (I lW 1)  degenerates to an identity matrix I. Therefore, b can be consistently estimated
by a standard logit model ignoring the spatial structure. The notation can also be greatly simplified
as Xi
⇤⇤ = Xi. Let G = (b 0,l )0 and G0 = (b̂00 ,0)0, where b̂0 is the estimate of b in the standard logit
model. The gradient terms reduce to G 0 0 0 0 0b ,i = Pi (1 Pi )Xi and Gl ,i = Pi (1 Pi )Hi b0 when l = 0,
where H0 0i is the ith row of an n⇥ k matrix H =WX .
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Linearizing ei around the initial estimates of parameter G0, we have
ei t e0i  Gi(G G0), (6)
where e0 b̂i =Contract 0i  P0i and P0
exp(X
i =
i )
ˆ . Re-organizing Equation (6), we can obtain1+exp(Xib0)
e0i +GiG0 t GiG+ ei. (7)
Define Zi as the ith row of a matrix of instruments Z. Consider a theoretical moment condition
E(Zi
0ei) = 0, the corresponding sample moment is thus
1 n
m(b ,l ) =
n Â Zi
0ei. (8)
i=1
A GMM estimator can be achieved by minimizing e 0ZMZ0e with respect to b and l , where M is a
positive definite weight matrix and e is defined as the n⇥1 vectors of ei. Note that the computation
load depends on the sample size n as it involves the inversion of an n⇥ n matrix. Hence, the
GMM estimator becomes infeasible when n is large. However, if M is set to (Z0Z) 1, minimizing
e 0ZMZ0e is equivalent to conducting 2SLS estimation of a regression with e as the error term and
Z as the set of instruments. From Equation (7), instead of minimizing e 0Z(Z0Z) 1Z0e with respect
to b and l , the GMM estimator can be achieved by performing 2SLS estimation of e0i +GiG0 on
Gi, using a matrix of instruments Z.
In sum, the LGMM estimation procedure can be conducted in the following two steps:
Step 1: Estimate a standard logit model of Contract with respect to all the exogenous variables
X to obtain a consistent estimate of b0, b̂0. Then calculate the residuals ê0i as well as the gradient
terms Ĝi = (Ĝb ,i, Ĝl ,i).
Step 2: Denote ê0+Ĝ ˆb b0, Ĝb and Ĝl as the matrix counterparts of ê0i +Ĝ ˆ ˆb ,ib0, Gb ,i, and Ĝl ,i.
Conduct 2SLS estimation of ê0 + Ĝ ˆb b0 on Ĝb and Ĝl using Z as a set of exogenous instruments.
More specifically, the 2SLS estimation involves the following two stage regressions:
• Stage 1: Regress Ĝ and Ĝ on Z, respectively, to obtain the predicted values Ĝp and Ĝpb l b l ,
where Z = (X ,WX) is the instrument set.
• Stage 2: Regress ê0 + Ĝ ˆb b0 on Ĝ
p
b and Ĝ
p
l . The corresponding coefficients of Ĝ
p
b and Ĝ
p
l
are the estimates of b and l , respectively.
The advantage of the LGMM method is that it requires only the standard logit and linear 2SLS
estimation. The linearization significantly reduces the computation time and load as long as l is
small and the true structure is given by Equation (3). See Klier and McMillen (2008) for a detailed
discussion of the finite sample properties of LGMM estimation.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
The main data source is the Dynamic Monitoring Survey of Internal Migrants in 2011 from
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the National Population and Family Planning Commission of China.12 This is a nationwide sur-
vey with 128,000 individual migrants (who are 16-59 years old) residing in 326 host cities in 31
provinces all over China. This survey includes individual demographic, work, and family informa-
tion such as age, gender, education, rural or urban Hukou status, marriage status, family members,
current residential city, home province, wage, insurance, on-the-job training, industry, occupation,
type of employer, how many years the migrant has stayed in the residential city, etc.13 In particular,
we know whether or not the migrant has signed a contract for the current job and whether their
jobs were introduced by their relatives, classmates, or friends from hometown.
We first delete the observations migrating within a province from the sample. Recall that the
co-villager network is defined as people from the same province and currently residing in the same
host city, which means for within-province migrants, all people in the host city are the co-villagers
of the targeting individual including the local residents. We also drop the observations for whom
contract information is missing as well as the outliers with the largest and smallest 1 percent of
wage. We end up with 28,614 observations and 300 host cities in the sample.14 These internal
migrants come from 31 home provinces in China. In spite of the large population of provinces in
China, the average size of the network is not very big in the sample. The median and the mean of
the network size are 51 and 118 co-villagers, respectively.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable Contracti equal to 1 if the individual migrant has
a job without a contract, and 0 if the individual has a job with a contract, either fixed-term or non-
fixed-term. In the full sample, 49 percent of the internal migrants have signed fixed-term contracts,
14 percent have signed non-fixed-term contracts, and 37 percent do not have any labor contract.
The first column of Table 1A reports the percentage of the population who hold contracts, while the
second column reports the percentage of those who do not hold contracts in various subsamples.
The last column presents the percentage of the type of migrants in the full sample. As shown,
women and long-term migrants (who have stayed in the host cities for more than 1 year) are a little
more likely to take regular jobs with contracts. Almost 40 percent of the migrants with rural Hukou
do not hold contracts, while those with urban Hukou are much less likely to accept contract-free
jobs. Interestingly, people who found their job through networks, which means their jobs were
introduced by their relatives, classmates, or friends from their hometown, are more likely to accept
contract-free jobs than others. Moreover, the less educated the person is, the less likely she will
hold a contract. A larger percentage of very old or very young migrants do not hold contracts.
Lastly, single migrants have a lower probability of holding contracts.
Table 1B presents summary statistics for job-related variables in the samples with or without
contracts. For contract-free jobs, the mean hourly wage is around 10.09 RMB. This is 20.34
percent lower than the mean hourly wage for the jobs with contracts (12.65). The corresponding
12The survey is conducted from 2010 until present year. We use 2011 because the information on contracts is only
available for this year.
13There are 15 industries as categorized in the survey including manufacturing, mining, agricul-
ture/forestry/pasture/fishing, construction, electric/coal/water supply, wholesale and retail, lodging and catering, social
service, finance/insurance/real estate, transportation/storage/communication, health care/sport/public welfare, educa-
tion/culture/radio/movie/television, R&D/technology service, government/political organizations/social groups, and
other industries; 10 types of employers including land contractor, government or public institution, state owned en-
terprise, self-employed small business, private business, Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan enterprise, Japanese/Korean en-
terprise, European/American enterprise, sino-foreign joint venture, and other enterprises; and 18 types of occupations
including technical professionals, business related, etc.
14Most missing observations correspond to the self-employed migrants who do not have contract information.
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mean weekly work hours are 9.34 percent higher (59.23 versus 54.17). The percentage of the
population with insurance (including pension, medical insurance, injury insurance, unemployment
insurance, maternity insurance, and housing funding) is significantly larger in the sample of regular
jobs. The average percentage is 34.79, compared to 4.06 in the sample of contract-free jobs. In
addition, only 18.44 percent of the workers with contract-free jobs have received skill training,
in comparison with 47.85 percent of contract-holders. These figures confirm that job openings
that provide contracts are much better in terms of payments, weekly work hours, insurance, and
training to employees.
Table 1C reports summary statistics for job flexibility measured by the years a migrant has
worked for her current employer in the samples with or without contracts. Job flexibility is reported
as 0 when a migrant has worked for her current employer for less than 12 months. Apparently,
migrants with contract-free irregular jobs hold their current jobs for a shorter period on average,
and thus the mobility of contract-free jobs is higher. Table 1D further reports the percentage
of migrants with different work experience in the current job in the contract and non-contract
samples. For example, the percentage in the non-contract sample (27.4%) is larger than that in
the contract sample (19.6%) when the period a migrant has worked for the current employer is
less than 1 year, the 25 percentile of job flexibility in the full sample. However, when the work
period is between 1 and 2 years (the median = 2), between 2 and 4 years (the 75 percentile = 4),
or between 4 and 41 years (the maximum value = 41), the opposite case shows up. To conclude,
more migrants with contract-free irregular jobs stick to their current jobs for a shorter time period,
whereas more migrants with regular jobs that offer contracts hold their jobs for a longer time
period. This demonstrates the revealed flexibility of the irregular jobs.
4 Empirical Results
Tables 2-10 provide estimation results for the SAR linear probability and the SAR logit models
for the full sample as well as different subsamples. “SAR Linear Model” reports the GS2SLS
estimation coefficients and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the SAR linear probability
models, while “SAR Logit Model” reports the marginal effects of LGMM results for the SAR logit
models. The empirical analysis is primarily based on the SAR logit models, however, the SAR
linear probability results are also provided for a robustness check. All regressions are conducted
with Stata14.
4.1 Basic Results of the Full Sample
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the full sample controlling for different sets of fixed
effects. As specified in Section 2, we use Z = (X ,WX) as a set of instruments to deal with the
endogeneity problem resulting from the spatial lagged dependent variable. X represents the set of
all exogenous variables. Specifically, Columns (1) and (4) only control for individual demographic
variables including the log value of hourly wage, gender (a dummy equal to 1 if gender is male,
and 0 otherwise), Hukou status (a dummy equal to 1 if rural, and 0 if urban), marital status (a
dummy equal to 1 if married or have married, and 0 if single), age, years the migrant has stayed
in the residential city. In Columns (2) and (5), we add the fixed effects of the current residential
city, industry, occupation, type of employer. Columns (3) and (6) also control for the product
of home province and education so as to control for the unobserved heterogeneous factors at the
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home-province-education level.
Both the SAR linear probability model and the SAR logit model show significant positive
effects of the spatial lagged dependent term. This implies that a migrant’s probability of accepting
a job that does not provide a contract increases with the decisions of other migrants in her co-
villager network who accept jobs without contracts. Taking Column (6) as the baseline outputs
with the most strict controls, the result suggests that when the percentage of migrants in the co-
villager network accepting jobs without contracts increases by 10%, the probability of the targeting
migrant accepting such jobs increases by about 0.13%. We understand that besides network, there
might be other possibilities that may explain the results we find. For instance, it may, to some
extent, represent the magnitude of information or skills collected by people migrating from the
same province to the same host city.
Our estimates also imply that a higher wage is associated with a lower probability of taking
irregular jobs that do not offer a contract. Migrants with rural Hukou, married migrants, and
younger migrants are also more likely to accept contract-free irregular jobs. For married migrants,
one possible explanation is that they may have families back in their home province, and thus
they value flexibility more as they need to visit their families more often. The reason why young
migrants find bad contract-free jobs may be due to their lack of work experience.
4.2 Migrants Who Found Jobs through Networks
As mentioned in Section 2, we identify the more effective co-villager networks by dividing
the sample into two subsets: (1) migrants who found their jobs through the co-villager networks,
that is, their jobs were introduced by their relatives, classmates, or friends from hometown; (2)
migrants who found their jobs through other channels, such as local friends in the host city, the
internet, job-searching agents, and so on. There should be more job-related interconnections in
the network of the former case. We anticipate that migrants who found their jobs through their
co-villager networks tend to work together with their co-villagers and there is a larger network
effect.
We utilize the same network weight matrix constructed in the full sample and run regressions in
both subsamples. Table 3 only reports the estimates of the specification with the same controls as in
Columns (3) and (6) in Table 2 using the GS2SLS and LGMM methods. As predicted, the network
effects in Subsample (1) are more than twice those in Subsample (2) regardless of the estimation
methods. Recall that the percentage of contract-free jobs in Subsample (1) is also higher than that
in Subsample (2). The estimation outcome is consistent with the literature that the quality of jobs
introduced by contacts is usually low especially for low-educated workers.15
4.3 Network Effects in Different Home Provinces
Next, we run regressions for people from different home provinces, controlling for the de-
mographic variables as well as the host province, industry, occupation, type of employer and ed-
ucation fixed effects. In these regressions, we do not include the fixed effects of the host city
and the product of home province and education, because the number of observations in some
subsamples is not large enough to have sufficient degrees of freedom. Table 4 demonstrates the
heterogeneous network effects for migrants from Sichuan, Henan, Anhui, and Hunan, which are
the 4 largest provinces from which migrants move out. The proportion of migrants in our data
15Recall again that 69 percent of the migrants have an education level of middle school or below in our sample.
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from these provinces are 13.13%, 10.66%, 10.57%, and 6.47%. The SAR logit model shows sig-
nificant network effects in Sichuan and Henan provinces, and the effect is stronger in Sichuan. We
also draw Figure 1 to illustrate the heterogeneous network effects in all home provinces on a map,
with the darker color representing the larger magnitude of network effects. The blank provinces
mean that the network effects are insignificant there. As we can see, Chongqing and Jiangxi
have the largest effects, followed by Shandong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Heilongjiang, Gansu,
and Henan. Among these 9 provinces with significant effects, two-thirds (Gansu, Sichuan, Hei-
longjiang, Chongqing, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi) have higher percentage of contract-free jobs than
the mean percentage in the full sample. Liaoning is an exception that has a negative coefficient.
Different culture and norms across home provinces may explain the various network effects esti-
mated.
The heterogeneous effects across home provinces provide important policy implication. In the
province of large network effects and a relatively high percentage of contract-free jobs, there is
dynamic concentration of job-contract types among migrants from the same home province over
time. If migrants from certain home provinces always find “bad” low-paid jobs that do not offer
contracts, their consumption in the host city as well as the remittance they send back to their home
province will be lower than migrants from other home provinces, which will further contribute to
income inequality across regions.
4.4 Network Effects with Different Types of Employers
We further categorize the full sample into 4 different types of employers: (1) private and self-
employed business, (2) state-owned enterprises, (3) Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, or foreign en-
terprises, and (4) sino-foreign joint venture enterprises. We run regressions in these subsamples,
controlling for the same fixed effects as in Section 4.3. Both SAR linear probability models and
SAR logit models show significant network effects only for type (1) and (2) employers in Table 5.
The effect is larger for the latter, presumably because migrants generally cannot enter these institu-
tions through formal recruitment process and they only work there as temporary employees, which
is exactly the group that relies more on co-villager networks to seek jobs. Moreover, temporary
jobs are also relatively less likely to offer contracts. Foreign firms or sino-foreign joint venture
firms usually obey the law more strictly and offer less contract-free jobs.
4.5 Network Effects in Different Industries
We also investigate network effects in different industries and only observe significant effects
in 3 industries: manufacturing, construction, and lodging and catering. Table 6 reports the GS2SLS
and LGMM estimates (controlling for the same fixed effects as in Section 4.3) for the 4 largest in-
dustries, among which only wholesale and retail is insignificant. As we can see, the network effect
is largest in the construction industry, followed by lodging and catering and manufacturing indus-
tries. Take construction as an example. A construction project in China is often contracted out to
a team in which the members are usually recruited from the same village. Therefore, the migra-
tion decision, job search process, and the contract decision of these people are strongly influenced
by the co-villager network. Moreover, it is easier for these co-villagers who work in the same
workplace to form a defacto “mini labor union,” which could take the place of a formal contract.
The heterogeneous effects across different employer types and industries suggest that to im-
plement the labor contract law better, more attention should be paid to (1) the private and self-
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employed business as well as the state-owned enterprises, and (2) manufacturing, construction as
well as lodging and catering.
4.6 Network Effects for Migrants of Different Education Levels
In Table 7, we investigate the network effects for migrants of different education levels: primary
school or below, middle school, high school or secondary technical school, and junior college
or above. Both the GS2SLS and LGMM estimates (controlling for the same fixed effects as in
Section 4.3) reveal that the migrants with lower education levels rely more on co-villager networks.
According to the SAR logit model, significant network effects only exist among migrants with
education levels below high school. The magnitude is largest for middle school graduates while
slightly lower for migrants with primary education or below.
4.7 Robustness Check for Other Subsamples
Lastly, we conduct sensitivity analysis in the following subsamples: (1) males versus females;
(2) migrants with rural Hukou versus urban Hukou; (3) long-term migration (people who have
stayed in the residential city for more than a year) versus short-term migration (people who have
stayed in the residential city for a year or less than a year). Tables 8-10 only report estimates
with the most strict controls as in Columns (3) and (6) in Table 2 using the GS2SLS and LGMM
methods, respectively. According to the SAR logit model, network effects are slightly larger for
short-term migrants and become insignificant for women and migrants with urban Hukou.
5 Conclusion
This paper employs a comprehensive data set from a nationwide survey to study how co-
villager networks affect internal migrants’ decision of accepting irregular jobs without contracts
in the labor market of China. Surrounded by a network with a large amount of co-villagers work
for business that do not provide contracts, the migrant not only has limited job choices, but also
knows little about the benefits a regular labor contract would offer due to lack of information. Ad-
ditionally, the network may serve as a “mini labor union” that raises the bargaining power of the
migrants and substitutes for the contract with respect to employment protection. As a result, the
migrant tends to accept a contract-free job offer that features flexibility. We use a spatial lagged
dependent term to capture the network effect, estimated by a GS2SLS method for the SAR linear
probability model and a linearized GMM approach for the SAR logit model. Our empirical work
confirms that the probability of a migrant’s acceptance of jobs without contracts increases with the
acceptance of jobs without contracts of other migrants in her co-villager network. We further find
that the network effects are larger in the subsamples of migrants whose jobs were introduced by
their co-villagers and less educated migrants and there are heterogeneous network effects across
home provinces, employer types, and industries. Our findings offer policy implications from the
aspects of income inequality and the implementation of the labor contract law.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Heterogeneous Network Effects across Home Provinces
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the heterogeneous network effects across home provinces. The provinces with significant
effects are colored in red and the darker color represents the larger magnitude of network effects.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1A: Percentage of Population with and without Contracts
Has Contract (%) No Contract (%)
Percentage in the
Full Sample (%)
Full Sample 63.35 36.65 -
Gender Male 62.24 37.76 59.00
Female 64.95 35.05 41.00
Hukou Rural 60.61 39.39 84.97
Urban 78.84 21.16 15.03
Migrating Years Equal to or Less than 1 Year
More than 1 Year
61.75
64.43
38.25
35.57
40.20
59.80
Found Job Yes 61.32 38.68 42.19
through Network No 64.83 35.17 57.81
Education School Dropouts 41.72 58.28 1.63
Primary School 45.87 54.13 14.07
Middle School 59.62 40.38 53.45
High School 70.92 29.08 14.15
Secondary Technical School 79.80 20.20 6.57
Junior College 87.17 12.83 6.29
University 93.30 5.70 3.55
Graduate School 96.43 3.57 0.29
Age [16, 18) 50.82 49.18 1.49
[18, 30) 68.08 31.92 43.98
[30, 40) 63.34 36.66 31.83
[40, 50) 55.65 44.35 19.76
[50, 59] 50.95 49.05 2.95
Marital Status Married 67.64 32.36 69.56
Single 61.48 38.52 30.44
Note: Table 1A reports the percentage of population who have contracts or not in different subsamples of (1) males or
females, (2) rural or urban Hukou, (3) long-term migrants (staying in the host city for more than a year) or short-term
migrants (staying in the host city for a year or less than a year), (4) migrants who found their jobs through networks
or not, (5) different education levels, (6) different ages, and (7) different marriage status.
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Table 1B: Statistics of Job-Related Variables in the Contract or Non-Contract Samples
# of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Hourly Wage Full Sample 28,614 11.71 6.35 3.50 10.36 48.75
Has Contract 18,128 12.65 6.83 3.50 10.63 48.75
No Contract 10,486 10.09 5.03 3.50 8.93 43.13
Weekly Working Hours Full Sample 28,614 56.02 13.51 2 56 112
Has Contract 18,128 54.17 13.09 4 50 112
No Contract 10,486 59.23 13.61 2 60 112
Full Sample Has Contract No Contract
Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%)
Insurance Pension 29.04 68.66 44.62 53.43 3.83 94.98
Medical Insurance 33.58 64.16 49.14 47.95 6.68 92.19
Injury Insurance 38.21 58.21 54.00 41.56 10.90 86.99
Unemployment Insurance 18.48 78.15 28.32 67.17 1.49 97.12
Maternity Insurance 12.93 83.35 19.83 75.13 1.01 97.55
Housing Fund 8.30 88.45 12.84 82.77 0.45 98.25
Average 23.42 73.50 34.79 61.34 4.06 94.51
Work Skill Training 37.07 62.93 47.85 52.15 18.44 81.56
Note: Table 1B presents the summary statistics for the job-related variables in samples with or without contracts, sep-
arately. The job-related variables include hourly wages, insurance (i.e. pension, medical insurance, injury insurance,
unemployment insurance, maternity insurance, and housing fund) as well as work skill training.
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Table 1C: Statistics of Job Flexibility in the Contract or Non-Contract Samples
Years a Migrant Has Worked for the Current Employer # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Job Flexibility Full Sample 28,580 3.23 4.16
Has Contract 18,108 3.35 4.16
No Contract 10,472 3.03 4.17
Note: Table 1C presents the summary statistics for job flexibility measured by the years a migrant has worked for her
current employer in samples with or without contracts, separately. Job flexibility is reported as 0 when a migrant has
worked for her current employer for less than 12 months.
Table 1D: Percentage of Migrants with Different Work Experience with the Current Employer in the Contract
or Non-Contract Samples
Years a Migrant Has Worked for the Current Employer Has Contract (%) No Contract (%)
Job Flexibility (0, 1) year: 25 percentile of job flexibility in the full sample = 1 19.58 27.40
[1, 2) year: 50 percentile of job flexibility in the full sample = 2 23.87 23.46
[2, 4) year: 75 percentile of job flexibility in the full sample = 4 24.85 21.64
[4, 41) years: maximum of job flexibility in the full sample = 19 31.70 27.50
Note: Table 1D presents the percentage of migrants with different work experience in the current job in the contract
and non-contract samples. For example, there are 19.58 percent and 27.40 percent of migrants who have worked for
her current employer for less than 12 months in the samples with and without contracts, separately. The cutoffs are
the 25 percentile, median, 75 percentile, and maximum of job flexibility in the full sample.
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Table 2: Basic Regression with Full Sample
Dependent variable: Contract
SAR Linear Probability Model SAR Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
W·Contract
ln(Wage)
Gender
Hukou Status
Marital Status
Age
Stay Years
0.5046***
(0.0219)
-0.1859***
(0.0063)
0.0446***
(0.0056)
0.0886***
(0.0071)
0.0285***
(0.0073)
0.0028***
(0.0004)
-0.0003
(0.0006)
0.1144***
(0.0188)
-0.0952***
(0.0065)
0.0072
(0.0054)
0.0284***
(0.0077)
0.0242***
(0.0069)
-0.0011***
(0.0004)
0.0012*
(0.0006)
0.2202***
(0.0185)
-0.0946***
(0.0065)
0.0077
(0.0054)
0.0253***
(0.0078)
0.0237***
(0.0069)
-0.0011***
(0.0004)
0.0010*
(0.0006)
0.1509***
(0.0098)
-0.2568***
(0.0064)
0.0714***
(0.0052)
0.1844***
(0.0076)
0.0469***
(0.0071)
0.0031***
(0.0004)
-0.0001
(0.0006)
0.0226***
(0.0065)
-0.0874***
(0.0123)
0.0061
(0.0053)
0.0307***
(0.0100)
0.0169**
(0.0071)
-0.0008**
(0.0004)
0.0011*
(0.0006)
0.0130**
(0.0058)
-0.0702***
(0.0215)
0.0039
(0.0043)
0.0259**
(0.0102)
0.0134**
(0.0068)
-0.0006*
(0.0003)
0.0008
(0.0005)
Fixed effects
Host City
Home Province
Industry
Occupation
Type of Employer
Education Level
Home Province*Education
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
# of Observations
R-Squared
28,614
0.3091
28,614
0.2482
28,614
0.2451
28,614
0.336
28,614
0.530
28,614
0.418
Note: Columns (1), (2), and (3) are the GS2SLS estimates from the SAR linear probability model with different sets
of fixed effects, while Columns (4), (5), and (6) are the marginal effects of the LGMM estimates from the SAR logit
model with the same controls. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level.
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Table 3: Regressions in Subsamples of Migrants Who Found Jobs through Co-Villagers or Not
Dependent variable: Contract
SAR Linear Probability Model SAR Logit Model
Job was Introduced Job Was Not Introduced
by Co-Villagers by Co-Villagers
(1) (2)
Job was Introduced Job Was Not Introduced
by Co-Villagers by Co-Villagers
(3) (4)
W·Contract
ln(Wage)
Gender
Hukou Status
Marital Status
Age
Stay Years
0.3546***
(0.0265)
-0.0914***
(0.0105)
0.0192**
(0.0085)
0.0258*
(0.0136)
0.0184*
(0.0109)
-0.0016***
(0.0006)
0.0011
(0.0010)
0.1578***
(0.0223)
-0.0974***
(0.0081)
-0.0039
(0.0068)
0.0239**
(0.0093)
0.0220**
(0.0085)
-0.0007
(0.0005)
0.0011
(0.0008)
0.0230**
(0.0101)
-0.0576***
(0.0189)
0.0145*
(0.0076)
0.0189
(0.0124)
0.0116
(0.0087)
-0.0010*
(0.0005)
0.0008
(0.0007)
0.0083**
(0.0042)
-0.0692***
(0.0131)
-0.0047
(0.0051)
0.0221**
(0.0089)
0.0100
(0.0068)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0005
(0.0005)
Fixed effects Host City, Home Province, Industry, Occupation, Type of Employer, Education, Home Province*Education
# of Observations
R-Squared
12,072
0.2529
16,542
0.2517
12,072
0.445
16,542
0.422
Note: Columns (1) and (3) report the estimates in the subsample of migrants who found jobs through co-villager
networks, while Columns (2) and (4) report the estimates for those who did not find job through co-villagers. Columns
(1) and (2) are the GS2SLS estimates from the SAR linear probability model, while Columns (3) and (4) are the
marginal effects of the LGMM estimates from the SAR logit model with the same controls. In all regressions, we
control for the fixed effects of the host city, home province, industry, occupation, type of employer, education, and the
interactions of home province and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 8: Network Effects for Male and Female Subsamples
Dependent variable: Contract
SAR Linear Probability Model SAR Logit Model
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W·Contract 0.2290*** 0.2429*** 0.0080*** 0.0020
(0.0211) (0.0269) (0.0028) (0.0069)
ln(Wage) -0.0784*** -0.1232*** -0.0380*** -0.0861***
(0.0083) (0.0102) (0.0081) (0.0179)
Hukou Status 0.0229** 0.0213* 0.0172*** 0.0261**
(0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0064) (0.0114)
Marital Status 0.0241*** 0.0229** 0.0078* 0.0083
(0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0045) (0.0083)
Age -0.0016*** -0.0005 -0.0005** -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Stay Years 0.0020*** -0.0008 0.0009** -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Fixed effects
Host City, Home Province, Industry, Occupation,
Type of Employer, Education, Home Province*Education
# of Observations 16,882 11,732 16,882 11,732
R-Squared 0.2509 0.2612 0.429 0.386
Note: Table 8 reports the co-villager networks for male or female migrants. Columns (1) and (2) are the GS2SLS
estimates from the SAR linear probability model, while Columns (3) and (4) are the marginal effects of the LGMM
estimates from the SAR logit model with the same controls. In all regressions, we control for the fixed effects of the
host city, home province, industry, occupation, type of employer, education, and the interactions of home province and
education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 9: Regressions in Subsamples of Migrants with Rural/Urban Hukou
Dependent variable: Contract
SAR Linear Probability Model SAR Logit Model
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W·Contract 0.2207*** 0.1216*** 0.0085* 0.0084
(0.0210) (0.0255) (0.0052) (0.0076)
ln(Wage) -0.0980*** -0.0821*** -0.0463** -0.0653***
(0.0074) (0.0117) (0.0224) (0.0237)
Gender 0.0081 0.0005 0.0032 0.0039
(0.0060) (0.0101) (0.0035) (0.0092)
Marital Status 0.0218*** -0.0015 0.0099 0.0043
(0.0077) (0.0119) (0.0062) (0.0114)
Age -0.0013*** 0.0010 -0.0006* 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stay Years 0.0009 0.0027** 0.0005 0.0021*
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0013)
Fixed effects
Host City, Home Province, Industry, Occupation,
Type of Employer, Education, Home Province*Education
# of Observations 24,313 4,301 24,313 4,301
R-Squared 0.2493 0.2988 0.415 0.442
Note: Table 9 reports the co-villager networks for migrants with rural or urban Hukou. Columns (1) and (2) are the
GS2SLS estimates from the SAR linear probability model, while Columns (3) and (4) are the marginal effects of
the LGMM estimates from the SAR logit model with the same controls. In all regressions, we control for the fixed
effects of the host city, home province, industry, occupation, type of employer, education, and the interactions of home
province and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level.
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Table 10: Regressions in Subsamples of Short-Term/Long-Term Migrants
Dependent variable: Contract
SAR Linear Probability Model SAR Logit Model
Long-Term Migrants Short-Term Migrants
(1) (2)
Long-Term Migrants Short-Term Migrants
(3) (4)
W·Contract
ln(Wage)
Gender
Hukou Status
Marital Status
Age
0.2484***
(0.0221)
-0.1068***
(0.0080)
0.0063
(0.0068)
0.0221**
(0.0093)
0.0268***
(0.0089)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
0.2325***
(0.0251)
-0.0717***
(0.0105)
0.0083
(0.0084)
0.0369***
(0.0119)
0.0206**
(0.0102)
-0.0015**
(0.0006)
0.0121**
(0.0059)
-0.0843***
(0.0220)
0.0052
(0.0059)
0.0260**
(0.0114)
0.0202**
(0.0095)
-0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0160***
(0.0060)
-0.0424***
(0.0100)
0.0036
(0.0060)
0.0262**
(0.0118)
0.0155**
(0.0078)
-0.0009**
(0.0004)
Fixed effects Host City, Home Province, Industry, Occupation, Type of Employer, Education, Home Province*Education
# of Observations
R-Squared
17,112
0.2572
11,502
0.2607
17,112
0.465
11,502
0.422
Note: Table 10 reports the co-villager networks for long-term or short-term migrants. Columns (1) and (2) are the
GS2SLS estimates from the SAR linear probability model, while Columns (3) and (4) are the marginal effects of
the LGMM estimates from the SAR logit model with the same controls. In all regressions, we control for the fixed
effects of the host city, home province, industry, occupation, type of employer, education, and the interactions of home
province and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level.
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